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Russian and Soviet history is characterized by many unique periods of development.
[Military doctrine has evolved in such cycles with specific identifiable variables. The
Soviet Union has experienced two definite revolutions in military affairs since its incep-
tion. This thesis delinates those variables evident in past doctrinal revolutions. Current
events within the Soviet Union are then examined to determine if a third revolution in
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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union is characterized by self-
negation: avowed proclamations of intent accompanied by concurrent and subsequent
actions often in contradiction. When analyzing the actions of the leaders of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and their policies, the resulting events and
negations must be considered.
The characteristic of self-negation is rooted in the philosophy of Karl Marx and
Vladimir Lenin. Marx, as an admirer of the philosopher Hegel, adapted his theories on
human society, earth, heaven and God into a doctrine fitted to the Communist move-
ment. One result was the theory of the Dialectic process which provides tools for use
in examination of ideas to determine their validity. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia dis-
cusses the Dialectic in depth.l
The first tool is the Law of the Unity and Struggle of Opposites. The underlying
principle of this law is that everything is tied to its opposite. The creation of an object
or idea also gives birth to the creation of its opposite. The law of unity causes these
opposites to be interconnected.
The Law of the Negation of the Negation is the second principle of the Dialectic.
"Every link that appears in the chain of phenomena includes its own negation-that is
the possibility of transition to a new form of being. "2 This law characterizes the direction
of development. "Its (the Law of the Negation of the Negation) basic content is the
unity of forward movement, progress and continuity in development and emergence of
1 The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3d ed., vol. 8 (Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Publish-
ing House, 1970). Translated by MacMillan, Incorporated, 1975, pp. 185-194.
2 The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, "Dialectic .Materialism," p. 190.
a new and relative recurrence of certain previously existing elements. "3 There is never a
period of stability or status quo. However, the negated state does not disappear all at
once. Its useable parts remain. In this dialectical negation, the only old that continues
in the system is that which has a useful place in that system created by the new.
The fmal law of the Dialectical process is the law of Reciprocal Transformation of
Quantitative into Qualitative Changes. "A change in the quality of an object occurs
when the accumulation of quantitative changes reaches a certain limit, and a leap-that
is the replacement of one quality by another—occurs. "4 The changes in the methods of
warfare can be analyzed using this law. When a new means of destruction is invented--
the tank, for example-the standards of warfare suddenly change, from trench to mobile
combat as from World War I to World War II style conflict.
Before the actual statement of the Dialectic by Marx, Russian actions reflected its
existence. Russian and Soviet military doctrinal changes have been driven by quests for
advances in mihtary technology which in turn implement and are implemented by eco-
nomic reform. This entire process is an example of the Dialectic at work. Certain ele-
ments of this process can be identified by examining Russian and Soviet liistory. These
specific features include technological advances, evolving military doctrine and economic
reform. Elements of this process are mihtary organization restructuring and peace ini-
tiatives which are based on the need for improved international relations.
This dynamic process continues today. Evidence exists that in the 1970s the pattern
was repeating itself.5 As before, the process started with a revolution in military affairs.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 See: William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," Problems of
Communism, July-Aug 1985, pp. 1-14; Michael MccGvvire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1987); John G. Hines, Phillip A. Peterson and
Norta Turlock, III, "Soviet Military Theor\' from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," The
Washington Quarterly, Fall 1986, pp. 117-136; and Mary C. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov and the
New Rovolution in Soviet Military Affairs," Defense Analysis, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 3-19.
The major proponent of the evolving doctrine was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov who pre-
sented the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Mihtar\' AITairs. This cycle of change is
currently in the economic phase. General Secretary Gorbachev appears to be the prime
supporter and motivator of this element. For this analysis to be vahd, the elements
identified above should be in evidence. This research is an attempt to examine the cur-
rent revolution to determine if they can be found.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To understand better the dynamic relation between the quest for mihtarv' technology
and military' doctrine, that doctrine and economic reform, and economic refonn and
miHtar\' technology, an examination of certain events in Russian and Soviet histor\' is
undertaken. The goal of this exercise is to determine if traditional patterns of behavior
regarding these factors do exist.
Military doctrine as defined by the Soviet Military Encyclopedia is a "system of views
adopted in a state for a given period of time on the objectives and character of a possible
war. on preparation of the country and armed forces for war, and on methods of waging
war." In Communist terms, military doctrine is concerned with all aspects of a future
war. Developing Russian militar>' doctrine, though not defined to the e.xtent of Soviet
militarv doctrine, can be traced back to the seventeenth centurv.
A. PETER THE GREAT (1672-1725)
When Peter assumed supreme power in 1696, his inheritance included a military
tradition which had evolved from the experiences of seventeenth century' Russian rulers.
"The deplorable showing made by the militia in the wars vvith Poland (1618, 1632-1634,
1654-1689) and Sweden (1656-1658) demonstrated the inferiority of untrained Muscovite
troops. "6 To ofi'set the lack of trained troops, foreign mercenaries were used to fill the
ranks of the standing army. These professional soldiers had to undergo regular training
in the art of warfare.7
6 Michael T. Florinsky, Russia, A History and Interpretaiion (New York, NY: The Macmillan
Company, 1959), p. 273.
7 Ibid.
The officers in charge of the regiments were either Russians who had mastered the
rudiments of military' science or foreigners—Germans. Swedes, Scotsmen. Poles.
Lithuanians, Greeks and Serbians. 8 Two additional reforms effected in reaction to mili-
tary' defeats of that century were great expansion in the size of the armed forces and an
even greater increase in the expenditure for its maintenance. Florinsky states that this
force modernization created a demand for new weapons based on technologies existing
in the West and not in Imperial Russia.9 The technologies which the Russians lacked
were in such areas as rilles, artillery and munitions.
In order to achieve the goal of military- modernization, existing policies concerning
the West had to be modified.
The government took the initial timid steps towards the development of Russia's
natural resources by importing foreign engineers and by granting concessions to
foreign capitaUsts. In 1632 the Dutch merchant Andrew Vinius cstabUshed the Tula
armament works which were later taken over by the government. lO
Other concessions were granted to foreigners in parts of the country where deposits of
iron ore were discovered. The government imported a large number of skilled
craftsmen-weavers, watchmakers, masons, smelters, ironmasters, painters, doctors and
astrologers.il
Complementing this mihtary inheritance, Peter brought with him the knowledge
gained from years of study of Western civilization and its warfare techniques. Florinsky
credits Kluchevsky with concluding that Peter sought to learn "western technique, not
western civilization. "12 Peter gained part of his experience from his travels through
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, p. 295.
1(3 Ibid.
11 Ibid, p. 299.
12 Ibid, p. 321.
Europe in 1697-98. His object was to master at least the rudiments of shipbuilding,
navigation and the military' arts.
The lessons of past conflicts taught Peter that in order to succeed in future conflicts,
a countr}' needed militan/' technology comparable to the enemies'. He used these lessons
to prepare for a future war which would help him achieve his first goals as czar: to se-
cure for Russia the rank of a great power and to gain access to the sea. Peter was
planning for a future war guided by the experiences of past conflicts. These past con-
flicts were characterized by the lag in Russian miUtan/' technology. As a consequence
of these efforts, mihtary doctrine was evolving.
The ruicr is credited for his efforts to modernize the Russian Empire in the areas of
the mihtarv, the economv and the societv. His reforms to modernize his countrv did
benefit some of his subjects in a limited fashion, but the desire to Westernize was not
motivated by humanitarian virtures. It was motivated by one basic fear, military
backwardness and obsolescence. Western Europe had already made dramatic shifts in
methods of warfare as a result of the Renaissance, Reformation and baroque periods of
craft and technology development. At a time when Europe was beginning to undergo
further dramatic change as a result of the Industrial Revolution, Russia was still primi-
tive and agrarian based. "Peter retained until his death an unfaltering belief in the
magical power of western technique and an unswerving devotion to the army, and es-
pecially to the navy."l3
The ruler drove his country to modernize to the detriment of the peasants. He felt
that Russia faced a potential military threat from those European nations which were
becoming technically better equipped. Credited with improving the Russian army and
creating the navy, he regarded all the countr>''s resources as being at the service of the
state for the 20od of the countrv as a whole.
13 Ibid, p. 326.
Peter required greater service from those serving in the military. Xoblcmen serving
as olTicers in the new Russian army or naw had to learn how to fight with modern
weapons and tactics. The concept of service was broadened to include the duty to be-
come educated. A decree in 1712 set the foundation for a new generation of military
officers and for the eventual elimination of the old. 14 All sons of landowners were di-
rected to report to the Senate, the chief executive and legislative organ of the central
government. Once they were divided into age groups, they were sent to study
seamanship, or to receive naval training or to report for duty in the army. 15 Peter in-
tended for the leadership of the armed forces to be professionally trained military offi-
cers.
During his rule, Peter engaged in war with Turkey, Sweden and Persia. His foreign
policies regarding the West in general, however, were based on the need to infuse his
country with the gains the West was making in craft and technology development.
Russian primitive industries were unable to meet the demands of a huge modernized
army equipped according to the standards of western Europe and of a new na\w.
During his drive for reform, he relied on experts invited from other countries to di-
rect new enterprises.
In 1702, he issued a proclamation, widely distributed in the West, opening Russia
to all foreigners (except Jews), and promising them, besides free passage and em-
ployment, full religious toleration and special law courts. This was intended above
all to attract military men and skilled artisans. 16
14 Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Incorporated, 1980),
p. 756.
15 Ibid, p. 757.
16 B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London, GB: The English
Universities Press Limited, 1956), p. 57.
In his later years, Peter also sent young Russians abroad to be trained in various
tiades.l7 These visits were made possible because of the improved relations with the
West.
B. ALEXANDER II (1855-1881)
A similar process occurred in the 1800s. After the Russians lost the Crimean War
against Great Britain, France and Turkey (1854-56), blame for the loss was placed on
the lack of competitive military technology and a backward social structure. The re-
pressive policies of Nicholas I (1825-1855), which he justified as necessary for the re-
tention of the security of the state, caused instead a great insecurity which contributed
to the loss of the war. His policies froze society which resulted in a loss of mihtary
technological advancement. Alexander II, Nicholas' successor, and his advisors realized
that the defeat was caused in large part by the empire's stagnation and that conditions
had to be brought to the level of those prevailing elsewhere in Europe.
A doctrine of the necessity for preparation for a future war based on the results of
the Crimean War can be identified as developing during Alexander's time. Shoddy ma-
terials, a dearth of ammunition and medical supphes, poor logistics, disease, and military
ineptitude were factors which Alexander and his minister of war, General Dimitry
Miliutin, saw all too clearly as weaknesses contributing to the loss of the war.
General Vliliutin is credited with instituting a reform program which drove mihtary
doctrinal change. "Important technical imiprovements were introduced in the organiza-
tion of the ministr}' of war, the general staff, the territorial distribution of the troops, the
commissariat, medical service, army engineers, mihtary courts."is MiHutin made addi-
tional changes which further affected doctrine.
n Florinsky, p. 326.
18 Ibid, p. 907.
Obsolete weapons of the Crimean period were gradually replaced by up-to-date arms
and equipment. Military schools, formerly under a separate central department.
were brought in 1863 within the purview of the ministn.' of war and were reorganized
in accordance with a liberal program which compared favorably with that of corre-
sponding schools under the ministry of education. 19
The outcome of the Franco-Prussian war, also made an impact on Miliutin. Both
armies were considered professional. The French had state-of-the-art weapons in their
arsenal—early machine guns and chassepot rifles. 20 Under Bismark's guidance, the
Prussian Army was considered to be ver\' advanced. "The armed forces, including the
trained reserves, could be brought to full strength on the shortest notice. "21 The threat
posed for Russia from these two powers was staggering. When comparing the miUtary
of Russia with France and Germany,
Miliutin realized that Russia was still far behind in the competition of the Powers,
and he felt that the time had come to radically reorganize the whole system of
recruitment, to create for the first time a system of universal militar\^ service, to
place the Russian army on the same footing as the German and the French. 22
With the encouragement of Miliutin, the czar had a decree adopted in 1874 which
created the cadre army. In general this meant that regular oOicers would provide train-
ing for conscripts who served for specific periods of continuous service. 23 The normal
term of active service was six years followed by nine years in the reserve and five more
years in the militia.24 The reserve and militia were mobilized onlv in emergencies.
19 Ibid.
20 Hajo Halbom, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York, NY; Alfred A.
Knopf, Incorporated, 1975), p. 216.
21 Kurt F. Reinhardt, Germany, 2000 Years (Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishins Com-
pany, 1950), p. 544.
22 Huah Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, lSOl-1917 (Oxford, GB: Oxford Universitv
Press, 1961), p. 387.
23 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., 3d. ed.
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 17.
24 Seton-Watson, p. 908.
Historians credit Alexander with instituting a great many reforms. 25 The long-term
goal of these reforms was to create a Russia which was on the same technological level
as other world powers: a Russia that would not again be beaten by advanced technology
of the enemy.
Alexander and Russian statesmen of that time realized that during the ensuing pe-
riod of domestic modernization Russia could not continue to exert the same amount of
influence abroad as it had in the past. Consequently, Russian foreign policy of the fol-
lowing reform period became somewhat less aggressive while the leaders attempted to
increase the level of indigenous technological development. 26 Alexander relied on im-
proved relations with the West to gain the expertise in foreign industrial technology
needed to improve outdated Russian industry and to introduce new technology. Many
of the textile industries were owned and operated by the British. 27 "Foreign entrepre-
neurs were also largely responsible for the transformation of Russian metallurgy. "28
"The aim of the Russian government was to increase the mihtary might and prestige
of the Russian State. . . . Industrial development was welcomed as modernizing the
countr}'. Foreign capital was welcomed as a means of developing economic
resouces."29 The Russian peasant bore the burden of this development. "Thus the
prestige of the autocracy, the military power of the empire, and the modernization of the
economy were paid for directly by grain exports and foreign loans and investments, and
indirectly by over-taxation and undernourishment of the peasants and workers. "30
25 For example see Seton-Watson, chp. 10.
26 W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 184S-71 (London, GB:
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 147.
27 J. N. Westwood, Endurance and Endeavour (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 1973),
p. 84.
28 Ibid.
29 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914 (New York, NY:
Frederick A. Praeger, Incorporated, 1958), p. 122.
30 Ibid, p. 123.
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C. THE FIRST SOVIET REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
New technologies which appeared in World War I guided the revolution in militarv'
affairs of the new communist nation. The implications of aviation, motorization and
chemical weapons combined with the threat posed by their existence in the enemy's ar-
senal caused extensive doctrinal review. "They (the new technologies) portended ... a
less clear distinction between the Tront' and the 'rear' in war. Bombing of cities, indus-
trial plants, and mihtary forces deep in the rear areas could be expected. Motorized
forces could conduct much deeper operations. "31
Lenin was extremely cognizant of the lessons of World War I regarding the pos-
session of the most up-to-date technology. In his remarks of March 15, 1918, upon
signing the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk. with Germany, he noted:
The war taught us a great deal, not only that people suffered, but especially that
those who have the best technology, organization, discipline and the best machines
emerge on top; it is this the war has taught us, and it is a good thing it has taught
us. It is essential to learn that without machines, without discipline, it is impossible
to hve in modern societv. It is necessary to master the highest technolosv or be
crushed. 32
The new technologies Lenin referred to would change the way a future war would be
fought and would require a well-trained officer corps and a literate manpower base for
military recruitment.
The military doctrine which evolved in the first years of the Communist regime was
based on the Soviet definition of peace as developed by Lenin. Peace means the de-
struction of all non-sociahst states. The term "peaceful coexistence" which also aflected
the early military' doctrine is defined in terms which are again much different from the
West's. By the end of 1920 Lenin had given up hope of the revolution sweeping the
31 Odom, p. 3.
32 Vladimir Lenin, Polnoe sobranie, vol. 27 (Moscow: Progress Publications, 1965), p. 127.
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world. "He replaced it with the more modest aim of securing Soviet Russia's coexistence
with the capitalist countries . . . ."33
Normal diplomatic relations, trade and credits with the capitalist enemies were
sought. Lenin's goal was the survival of the new regime. He did not abandon his belief
that the Communist revolution would spread. "Once embarked on the new course,
which included granting concessions to foreigners and engaging in trade negotiations
with capitahsts, he (Lenin) was at pains to emphasize that the new tactic constituted
neither opportunistic desertion of Communist principle nor any peace treaty with the
capitaHst world. "34
The personnel changes which took place during and immediately after the Bolshevik
Revolution are unique. Many of the czarist military leaders were killed; some joined the
revolutionaries. Several of the commanders of the new army were of the Voroshilov and
Frunze type, revolutionaries who had no former military experience. The early leaders
of the Red Army-Trotsky, Frunze, Tukhachevski, etc.--had many different ideas on the
requirements of a modern military and especially the course future development of the
Red Army should take. They were all united, however, on the fundamental essential
need for vastly improved literacy and rapid economic/technological development. 35 To
replace the poorly educated peasants who fought in the Civil War service academies were
started with military and general education being stressed.36 A new generation of mili-
tary leaders was being created. The Red Army became a school for literacy with ofTicer
education receiving top priority.
33 Bertram D. Wolfe, Lenin and the Twentieth Century (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1984), p. 142.
34 Ibid, p. 147.
35 D. Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1944), p. 203-209.
36 Ibid.
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The policy conceived in the aftermath of World War I and the Russian Civil War
was intended to be a way to avoid war with the West, which Lenin believed the new
nation would lose. For international relations this meant an increased need for greater
cooperation. One result of this policy was the Rapallo Treaty which established diplo-
matic relations with Germany and, more importantly, set the tenor of economic collab-
oration which included all-around technical and mihtary aid accorded to the Soviet
Union by Germany. 37 For the Soviet Union it meant devoting resources to building and
maintaining a strong economy based on infused German technology to build an
indigenous industry to support a military which would win in time of war.
The goal of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) was not intended to create a better
life for the peasant. NEP was introduced to keep the regime from collapsing. The short
term risks of this plan by reintroducing some capitalistic practices were olTset by the
desire and achievement of a large, modern military in the future. 38 Accompanying this
goal was the need for improved relations with other world powers. Due to the Rapallo
Treatv, the Soviets felt less threatened bv a unified front which would have allied
Germany with other European powers against the Soviets. Improved relations with
other powers were also needed to preserve peace, which would allow the Soviets to de-
vote attention to domestic troubles, consolidate internal power and to attract badly
needed economic and technical assistance.
Joseph Stalin inherited a deficiency in military technology that was intensified by the
treatment of the intelligentsia during the Civil War and the subsequent deportation of
many more members of that group. In developing the first Five Year Plan Stalin chose
the goal of modernizing heavw industry'. Heavw industry, Stalin argued, had to be at the
center of this effort, because that alone could guarantee the needs of the military defense,
37 Mildiail HeUer and Alcksandr Neloich, Utopia in Power (New York, NY: Suminit Books,
1986), p. 252.
38 Odom, p. 3.
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and because from heavy industry would in time come benefits for all the rest of the
economy. 39 The standing Red Army was reduced, which mislead many foreign observers
to conclude that the Soviet regime was disarming itself -^0 To many on the outside these
policies indicated the choice by Stalin of butter rather than guns. The year after Lenin's
death, 1924, became the year that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gained re-
cognition from Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece. Sweden, China, Denmark,
and France.41 These actions normalized relations with world powers which ensured the
fledgling countr\' would be able to devote time to relieving its domestic problems.
Betterment of the life of the average Soviet citizen was nof ^he driving force behind
Stalin's economic plan; the need to build Soviet heav\' industry was the driving force of
this reform. In November 1928 Stalin told the Central Committee why industry had to
occupy its central position in the plan. It is not enough to have caught up to the capi-
tahst countries in political forms, he claimed, "To achieve the final victory of sociahsm
in our country* we need to catch up and overhaul those countries in the technical and
economic sense. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed."'*2 In a later speech (Februar}'
1931), he dramatized even more the stigma which many Communists, including Lenin,
had felt was tainting Russia: "One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual
beatings she sufTered because of her backwardness . . .. We are fiftv or a hundred years
behind the advanced countries. We must catch up this distance in ten years. Either we
do it or we so under. "43
39 Geoffery Hoskinu, The First Socialist Society (Cambridge, MA: Haivard University Press,
1985), p. 150.
40 For a discussion of the changes surrounding the First Five Year Plan see: Heller and
Nekrich, and Hosking.
41 Heller and Nekrich, p. 209.
42 Hosking, p. 150.
43 Hosking, p. 150.
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The development of Soviet military doctrine coupled with the lessons of World War
I taught the Soviet regime the implication of new technologies for the future war with
the capitalists and drove the evolution of doctrine, technological development and eco-
nomic reform in the 1920s and 1930s.
D. THE SECOND REVOLUTION
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a second revolution in Soviet militar>' doctrine
was again being motivated by and motivated the quest for improved military technology
and economic reform. The events following World War II are ver>' similar to those of
the 1920s. Most of the active duty forces were demobilized. The system of military ed-
ucation was changed to bring about an extensive upgrading of military schools and ser-
vice academies. The Soviets learned from World War II that three new
technologies—nuclear weapons, missiles and cybernetics—emerged to affect the nature
of a future war and again reawakened the fear of Western technological advancement. -^-^
The doctrinal changes which resulted required that traditional military principles be
rejected and new ones adapted. The nature of war was redefined as the result of the new
technologies.
Assuming that the three technologies would change the nature of future war, Soviet
theorists considered it essential that military doctrine come to grips with two central
effects arising from them: the large firepower that nuclear weapons bring to the
battlefield, and the great range and accuracy in the delivery of that fire power made
possible by rocketr>' and cybernetics. -^5
In this case, as before, doctrine preceded technological advances. The Soviet force
structure of the late 1960s and 1970s and its associated weapons capabilities resulted
from this newly developing doctrine. Stalin's death added additional impetus to the de-
velopment of doctrine during the 1950s.
44 Odom, p. 4.
45 Odom, pp. 4-5.
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When Xikita Khrushchev came to power in 1953, economic reform was again
stressed as the major portion of the party agenda. At lirst the new leadership attempted
to reorganize the economy on a more stable and realistic basis. '^6 Emphasis was placed
on consumer goods, wage increases and price reductions. The ultimate goal of the re-
forms, however, was to rebuild the industrial-economic base of the country to counter
the effects of World War II.
The repressive policies Stalin used to achieve greater production at the expense of
the average citizen were no longer possible. Khrushchev tried to replace terror by
mobilizing the masses to participate in the political process. "He was concerned to
mobilize the people's energies lor production, to ease the harsher forms of compulsion
applied by Stalin, and to relieve the stark poverty in which so many lived before
1953. "•*" Perhaps this man of peasant background realized that a person whose life is
made easier and whose standard of living is raised will work harder to achieve the goals
of the state.
Though the Soviets had driven the development of their own atomic bomb and
subsequently exploded it in 1949, this was more a reaction to the events of 1945 over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Actual militarv' technological advancement seemed to stall.
While Khrushchev appeared to be pursuing peace by instituting his economic reforms
and by cutting the size of the armed forces, he was investing heavily in new military
technology.
The Soviet leadership seemed to suddenly recognize the new technologies emerging
from World War II had great impact on the future of the nation.
In keeping with these changed attitudes and policies, enormous sums were allocated
to science. New research institutes were created. Basic scientific research, which
had become almost nonexistent, was revived and expanded. The needs of the state.
46 Heller and Nekrich, p. 545.
47 Hosking, p. 353.
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always tied to the strengthening of its niihtan' capacity, required more highly refined
technology, more sophisticated weapons. -^8
The period of the 1950s and 1960s is characterized by great achievements in Soviet
mihtar}' technology which include the earth's first hydrogen bomb, new jet bombers, the
world's first artificial satellite and the first intercontinental balhstic missile. With these
events, the Soviets were achieving their goal of gaining parity with the West in militar}'
significant technology.
In the decade of the 1950s the Soviets renewed efforts to ensure peace. Indochina,
Austria and Yugoslavia were recipients of Soviet peace initiatives. -^9 in 1963 the Soviet
Union and the United States signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which coincided with
the Soviet Union's announced pursuit of peaceful coexistence and diplomatic detente
with the West. The paradox of Soviet behavior is revealed in the circumstances of the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. "Despite threatening noises and the occasional crisis that
erupted in relations with the Western powers, Khrushchev's foreign policy as a whole
was oriented toward enlarging contact and cooperations with the Western powers, par-
ticularly the United States. "50 Khrushchev was obsessed with the idea of comparing the
Soviet Union to the United States, in areas ranging from meat and corn production to
state-of-the-art technology.
During this time Soviet leaders sought to convince the West that its perception of
the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" was vahd. In actual practice, the definition
was quite different.
The CPSU . . . views peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle developing in
the pohtical, economic and ideological spheres in the international arena. By fight-
ing asainst the outbreak of another world war, and organizing and leading the
48 Heller and Netaich, p. 556.
49 Heller and Nckrich, p. 562.
50 Heller and Nekrich. p. 570.
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workers, national liberation, and all-democratic movements, the communists . . .
pave the way to the triumph of socialism in the whole world. 51
E. REVEALED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
V/hat has emerged from this brief studv of Russian and Soviet historv are certain
behavioral characteristics.
1. Change from the Top
A trait found is that change comes from the top. The political and mihtary
leaders recognize the need for reform and become the motivating forces. Resistance to
such change is inherent in the Russian and Soviet bureaucratic structure. This inertia
is dilTused throughout the system.
2. Technological Threat
A major factor driving the Russian and Soviet leaders was a fear of advancing
Western mihtary technology and the subsequent inabihty of both Russia and the Soviet
Union to keep pace. This characteristic "reflects a deep-seated historical sense of tech-
nical inferiority that has characterized the Russian and Soviet attitude to the West for
many years". 52 Russian and Soviet attempts to modernize are driven by this fear.
3. Doctrinal Development
Doctrinal development is a second variable evidenced in this historical exam-
ination. Discussions and development of doctrine precedes the achievement of the ca-
pabilities to fulfill doctrinal changes. The revolutionary doctrinal process is
characterized by force reductions accompanied by changes in military personnel. In-
creased emphasis on education is then stressed for the new and remaining mihtary lead-
ers. The stimulus to reaching the goal set by changed doctrine is econoniic reform. The
pinnacle of modernization is new mihtary technology.
51 Scientific Communism, A Glossary (Moscow, 1975).
52 C. N. Donnelly, The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev (Sandhurst, GB: Soviet Studies
Research Center, December 1986), p. 10.
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4. Peace Initiatives
A third trait which has been exposed is the efTect these drives for modernization
have had on foreign poUcies. During times of economic reform for modernization,
Russian and Soviet policies become less aggressive. At these times peace and improved
relations, especially with Western countries are sought. The leaders need a relaxation
in conflicts and hostilities in order to devote their energies and the countr\''s resources
to domestic improvements and to entice Western capital. Throughout these periods,
"peaceful coexistence" has been the watchword.
5. Dialectical Influence
That the Dialectical process weaves through this histor\' is evident. All the
changes in the internal composition of the country' are guided by its opposite-external
forces. Doctrinal changes have resulted from the outcome of events outside Imperial
Russia and the Soviet Union. Once a doctrine is accepted, there always appears its ne-
gation, in the form of new circumstances or technology, to cause a negation of the ex-
isting doctrine.
The negation of the existing doctrine involves the emergence of a qualitatively
new doctrine. Revolutions of military doctrine are dynamically related to economic re-
form and thus are also governed by the Dialectic. The historv' of Russia and the Soviet
Union is interspersed with concurrent periods of economic reform; however, until the
death of Stalin these reforms have never been instituted for their stated purpose-the
betterment of life for the average citizen. In post-Stalinist time, economic reform has
been intended to benefit the average citizen to a certain degree. The proclaimed goal
of economic reform has been negated by its opposite-advancement of mihtary
technology-for the good of the security of the state whether that state was Imperial
Russia or the Soviet Union.
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Whatever security was perceived to have existed had been negated by insecurity
caused by the cliallenge of advancing Western technology and the incapabiUiy of Impe-
rial and Soviet domestic technology to keep pace. Changes of indigenous doctrine then
were affected by new tecimology quests of the leadership.
Thus a full circle through the Dialectic is completed. This dynamic process
continues today. Evidence exists that in the 1970s the pattern was repeating itself. The
remainder of this research attempts to trace this third revolution. The elements identi-
fied as necessarv for such a revolution are examined.
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III. EXAiMINATION OF THE THIRD REVOLUTION
Certain characteristics of traditional Soviet behavior have been identified as neces-
sary components of a revolution in military doctrine caused by a perceived lag in their
indigenous technology. While these elements are all interconnected in a dynamic re-
lationship, they can be divided into two general categories. The historical analysis re-
vealed that measures fall under the general divisions of either the militar\' or the
economy. The militar\' related changes in doctrine traditionally have preceded economic
reform measures. The following discussion examines the militarv' based variables.
A. THE TECHNOLOGICAL QUEST
The motivating factor of Russian and Soviet policies has always been the quest for
new technology which is seen as essential for future war. There are many new techno-
logical advances in which the West leads in development when compared to the Soviet
Union. "The Russian nightmare has always been that a revolution in technology will
challenge the way they've designed their forces. "53 Figures 1 and 2 compare 20 areas of
technological advancement in 1985 and 1987 of the United States and the Soviet Union.
While there are several technologies listed which the Soviets are
achieving parity, in many areas they are lagging behind the United States and are losing
ground. The disparity exists in such technological areas as computers and software,
electronics and microelectronics, artificial intelligence and genetic engineering.
Many experts have examined the importance of such technologies and the military
weakness of the Soviets from the resulting las. Because the number of fields in which
the lag exists is numerous, microcircuitry as one typical area will be examined. So called
53 Quoted from Stuart Cannes, 'The Soviet Lag in Iliah-Tcch Defense," Fortune, 25 No-
vember 1985, p. 107.
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U.S. U.S./U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R.
Basic Technologies Superiority Parity Superiority
Computers and software -^-X
Electronic signal processing X
Electro-optical processing
(Including Infrared) X





(Includes automated control) X
Robotics and machine
Intelligence X
Guidance and navigation X-^
Materials (lightweight, high-








Aerodynamics /flu Id dynamics X
Conventional warheads (Includes
all chemical explosives) X
Directed energy (laser) X
Nuclear warheads X
Optics X
Power sources (mobile) (Includes
energy storage) X
This list Is limited to 20 technologies, selected (by the Department of
Defense) with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall
U.S. and U.S.S.R. basic technology. These technologies are "on the shelf"
and available for application. The technologies selected have the potential
for significantly changing the military capability In the next 20 years. The
arrows denote that the relative technology level Is changing significantly In
the direction Indicates. Relative comparisons of technology levels shown
depict overall average standing only; countries may be superior, equal or
Inferior In subcategories of a given technology.
Source: Department of Defense, The FY 1985 Department of Defense Program for
Research and Development (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984).





































all chemical explosives) X
Directed energy (laser) X
Nuclear warheads X
Optics X
Power sources (mobile) (includes
energy storage) X
This list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected by the Department
of Defense with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall
U.S. and U.S.S.R. basic technology. The conditions which apply for Figure
1 apply to this list.
Source: Department of Defense, The FY 1987 Department of Defense Program
for Research and Development (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1986).
Figure 2. 1987 Technologies
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"smart weapons" are made possible by microcircuitry. Warheads with a variety of con-
ventional energy munitions that are guided to targets with no error are made possible
through the use of this technology. These warheads can seek a target without external
assistance and can discriminate between such potential targets as tanks and trucks.
The implications for the Soviets of such a technology are staggering. This particular
technology has again raised the old specter of lagging Soviet technology. The fear is
intensified because the physical concepts involved in its development are not within the
Soviet inventor^' of capabilities. "Suddenly, out of nowhere, microelectronics is forcing
the Soviets to reconsider everything they've done. It could make a 25-year investment
in militarv' technology obsolete."54
Even though the Soviets already devote proportionally more resources to the miU-
tary than the United States does, they are learning that vastly greater commitments are
necessary to match the West's drive to incorporate microelectronic components into a
new generation of high-technology weapons and battle management computers. The
combination of microelectronics and computers is very threatening to the Soviets. "The
revolution in defense mircoelectronic challenges the Soviets to compete on a new playing
field just as they were attaining parity with the West in more traditional areas of
w^eaponr\'."55
In the changing character of "smart weapons," the effect of the Dialectic can be
seen. Not only are nuclear weaponry' and missile technology being negated, the negation
is being caused by qualitatively new weapons based on new physical properties. In the
true sense of the Dialectic, however, these outdated technologies are not disappearing
from doctrinal statements altogether. A 1986 report in Fortune stated that the Soviet




their main preoccupation is catching up. 56 Reports of this lag continued in 1987. Of
particular interest is that in the reports cited in Figures 1 and 2, the technologies selected
have the potential for significantly changing the military capabilities of the Soviet Union
in the next 10 to 20 years.
The importance of this lag in technology then is that these basic technologies are
needed by both the United States and the Soviet Union for weapons based on new-
principles. Stubbs reported that the Soviet Union still lags behind the United States
across a broad spectrum of miUtarily significant basic technologies. 57 He concluded that
"computer hardware and microelectronics represent the most serious weakness in Soviet
advanced-technologies strategic defense development. "58
The "technology gap" which the Russians and the Soviets have feared throughout
their history- does indeed seem to have appeared again. The possibility of the Soviet
nightmare being repeated is not a surprise to the present Soviet leaders, however. The
second factor of the drive for military technology within the Soviet Union, doctrinal
change, dates back to the 1970s and was expressed by one man, Marshal Nikolai V,
Ogarkov.
B. DOCTRINAL REVOLUTION
Warsaw Pact military scientists have long anticipated that scientific and technolog-
ical progress would continue to produce important, even revolutionar\'. changes in mili-
tary affairs. In a secret Czechoslovak document of January 1968, these scientists stated
that
The revolution in military affairs is not a closed process. On the contrary, in view
of the expected advance of the scientific-technical revolution, one can expect further
56 Gene Bylinsky, 'The Higli-Tech Race," Fortune, vol. 114, no. 8, pp. 28-38.




important changes in military affairs in the future, the development of which with
regard to the present stage may not be necessarily a mere evolutionary' nature and
may not merely complete the existing process. 59
More recently, evidence has been accumulating to indicate that a revolution in mil-
itary affairs was occurring. That doctrinal changes were going on in the Soviet Union
during the decade of the 1970s remains under discussion. While it remains at debate
exactly when and what the changes were, Soviet military doctrine was under discussion
in the Soviet Union during that time. 60
The general theme of the evolving Soviet military doctrine is the mastery of the large
scr^c heater wide operations executed by multi-front operations. An attack of this form
would involve two or more large strategic groupings of forces over a large geographic
area. "They (the Soviets) now plan for a theater operation to consist of several fronts
conducting dynamic, fast moving operations to seize strategic ground objectives located
600 to 800 kilometers away."6i These multi-front operations would require a force de-
velopment and military technological support of unprecedented scale and speed. The
stimulus for this change in the magnitude of Soviet operations is that the new technol-
ogies that will permit, in theory, the communications, control, and accuracy of fire sup-
port required for such operations-the type of technologies discussed in the last section.
59 Problems of the Party's Military Policy in Light of the 13th Congress of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia, lecture given by Colonel Fraaktisek Herfut to the highest militarv' functionaries
of the Ministry- of National Defense, January' 1968, p. 4.
60 For a discussion regarding the evolution of Soviet doctrine see: Harriet Fast Scott and
William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.P.., 3d. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982);
Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington. DC: The Brooldngs
Institute, 1987); John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theoty
and Practice (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1981), pp. 5-29; William T. Lee and Richard
F. Starr, Soviet Military Policy Since World JVar II (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institutional Press,
1986), pp. 23-40; William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," Problems
of Communism. July-Aug 1985, pp. 1-14; and John G. Hines, Pliillip A. Peterson and Norta
Turlock, III, "Soviet Militarv Theory' from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," The Washington
Quarterly, Fall 1986, pp. 117-136.
61 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1984, 3d ed. (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 17.
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When Marshal Ogarkov became Chief of the General Staff in 1977, he inherited a
militan,' organization which by that time had achieved approximate military parity with
the United States. He also came to his new position at a time when the Soviet military
was making its most significant doctrinal changes since the original and second revo-
lutions in military affairs under M. V. Frunze in the 1920s and under Marshal
Sokolovskiy during the 1950s and 1960s respectively. 62
In 1977, shortly after Ogarkov became Chief of the General Staff, Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev made his famous "no first use" statement regarding nuclear weapons.
According to Cutshaw, "That statement promulgated new Soviet military doctrine foi
fighting theatre war."63 As Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov had the responsibility
of overseeing the development of the strategy, plans, and direction of the organizational
changes and revisions to reflect this doctrine. The Soviets would now prepare for the
possibility of fighting and achieving victory in a conventional war while maintaining a
preparedness to preempt enemy use of nuclear weapons.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet doctrinal writings showed a concern
for exploiting new technologies. Marshal Ogarkov had long been one of the strongest
proponents of the importance of high-technology advancements. Herspring states that
the need for the Soviet armed forces to understand and adapt to major advances in the
scientific-technical sphere dominated Ogarkov's major writings since 1977.64 "in addi-
tion to arguing that the scientific-technical revolution is the main factor driving the
Soviet military thought," Ogarkov took an unusual step for a senior mihtary ofilcer. that
62 Dale R. Hersprijig, "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet
Military Affairs," Comparaiive Strategy, vol. 6, no. 1, 1987, p. 29.
63 Charles Q. Cutshaw, AVho's in Charae," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1986, p.
81.
64 Herspring, Comparative Strategy, p. 29.
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"of placing his discussion in the wider context of Soviet mihtary thought rather than in
the more narrow bureaucratic framework common to most his colleagues. "65
1. The Nature of the Revolution
In 1978, Ogarkov referred to the scientific-technical revolution in mihtar>^ affairs
as "a process . . . which creates quaUtatively new weapons and military technology as
well as modernizing conventional 'classical' means of combat and significantly raises
their combat possibilities. "66 Ogarkov's presentation of his beliefs in the need for the
scientific-technological revolution in military afiairs continued with more and more ur-
gency throughout the next several years. Doder credits Ogarkov as intellectual and
highly articulate--"the prototype of a modern officer" who as a straight-forward man was
prepared to assert his views both vocally and proHfically.67
In 1982, Ogarkov wrote Always on Guard ^Ready) in Defense of the Fatherland,
here he expressed his concern about the fast pace of the development of American mih-
tary technology. He said that measures must be taken to modernize strategic forces.
Then he warned: "In these conditions, the failure to change views in time, and stag-
nation in the development and deployment of new kinds of military construction, are
fraught with serious consequences. "68
Interestingly enough, though Ogarkov was "reassigned" in September 1984, his
influence continued throughout the years. A Red Star interview in 1984 credited
Ogarkov with stating that a wide-range of innovations in Western technology was
making possible at least a tenfold increase in the strike potential of conventional weap-
ons. The interview also contained the warning that awful consequences would result if
65 Ibid.
66 N'. V. Ogarkov, "Voennaya nauka i zashcliita sotsialisticheskogo otechestva" (Militar>- sci-
ence and the defense of the socialist fatherland), Kommunist, 1978, no. 7.
67 Dusko Doder, Shadows and Whispers (New \'ork, NY: Random House, 1986), p. 229.
68 N. V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosii k zashchite otechestva (yMvvays ready to defend the
fatherland) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982).
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the U.S.S.R. failed to match Western technology. In November 19S4, a lengthy article
by Ogarkov commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, "On the
40th Anniversary of the Great Victory: Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms" appeared in
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil.
More interesting, in January' 1985, a new edition of Taktika (Tactics), the basic
Soviet military text for company and field-grade officers was published. It represented
the first new edition since 1966 and will be the basic text for educating Army oflicers
through the 1990s. 69 This new edition of Taktika reflects Ogarkov's thinking through-
out, deemphasizing nuclear weapons and placing emphasis on combined arms oper-
ations, developing initiative in junior leaders and achieving superiority through
sophisticated conventional weapons technology. "^0
Of even greater significance was the appearance in 1985 of History Teaches
Vigilance, Ogarkov's book pubhshed by the Ministry of Defense. Ogarkov assures
readers that "The Soviet people are doing everything necessary so that the defense ca-
pability of the Soviet state will always be at a high level and that its Armed Forces will
always be on guard."7l He continued his theme of technological revolution of weapons
by citing examples of how advances in weaponry in the past effectively changed the
outcome of past conflicts. He brings these concepts to present terms:
A profound and, in a full sense of the word. revolutionar\' change in militarv' affairs
is continuing in our day in connection with further development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons, rapid development of electronics and in connection
with the significant qualitative improvement of conventional weapons and methods of
armed conflict.'!'^
69 Cutshaw, p. 82.
70 Ibid.




Of importance, Ogarkov says, is understanding the full diversity of linkages and
relationships in war. In the external factors he liscs the development of science and
technology. Enumerating the internal linkages and relationships in war, he says are
"most of all, the correlation of forces of the warring parties; the technical level of their
equipment and several other methods of conducting military operations which directly
determine their success or failure"73 Again, he issues a warning
It is particularly important to understand the dialectical process of developing miU-
tary afiairs at the present stage, under conditions of rapid scientific and technolog-
ical progress. Tardiness in restructuring views and stagnation in working out and
implementing new questions of miUtar\' art and construction are fraught with serious
consequence."'^
Ogarkov appears a firm proponent of the need for a scientific-technical revolution in
developing new weapons. He also presents a time line for the advances. In 1981 in "Na
strazhe mimogo tuda" (On guard for peaceful work)75 and Always ready to defend the
fatherland (1982), he said that the revolutionary changes in major technologies occur
every ten or twelve years.
2. The Revolution and the Economy
The course of the Soviet economy is an important factor in the scientific-
technical revolution in miUtary affairs. Its importance is amplified by its inclusion in the
doctrinal discussions of Ogarkov. In 1978. example, Ogarkov quoted Friedrich Engles:
"Nothing depends on economic conditions like a country's army and navw. Weapons,
structure, organization, tactics and strategy depend above all on the level of production
and the means of communication which has been achieved at a given point in time. "'6
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 N. V. Ogaxkov, "Na strazhe mimogo tuda," Kommunist, no. 10, 1981.
76 Ogarkov, "Voermaya nauka i zashchita sotsialisticheskogo otechestva" (Militar>' science and
the defense of the socialist fatherland), Kommunist, no. 7, 1978. He repeated this quote in 1984.
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In "Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland," Ogarkov called for the Soviet
economy to be modernized, since, in his view the level of development at that time was
not adequate to solve "major technical problems" and to make it possible for new types
of weapons, including those necessary for "a devastating counterattack in any situation
and under any conditions" to be developed in a short period of time. In that book he
also advocated a "coordinated mobilization of the military force and overall national
economy." He said measures must be taken to modernize Soviet strategic forces and
enhance the performance of the Soviet economy.
Even after Ogarkov's reassignment, his theories of accelerating the Soviet
economy to the development of high-technology weapons continued to exert influence.
"He had become dedicated to the thesis that the basis of Soviet power was the Soviet
economy, and that since the economy was showing structural weaknesses, it was man-
datory to take corrective steps. "77 Rice supports the conclusion that part of Ogarkov's
scientific-technical revolution in military alTairs was reliant upon a healthy, productive
economy. "For Ogarkov and those like him, the end product of the modernized Soviet
economy will be high-technological weapons. Vlodern weapons which will be fought
with precision-guided munitions and reconnaissance drones. "78
Soviet Colonel General M. A. Gareyev's book, M. V. Frunze: Voennyi
teoretik, published in 1985, supports the argument that without improvement in the
technological base of the entire economy, the Soviet military will be hard-pressed to take
advantage of the new opportunities being offered by the advancement of modern tech-
See Ogarkov, "Zashchita sotsializma: op>l istorii i sovremennost" (The defense of socialism: the
experience of liistory and the present), Krasnaya zvezda, 9 May 1984.
77 Doder, p. 229.
78 Condoleezza Rice, 'The Soviet Militar>' under Gorbachev," Current History, October 1986,
p. 314.
31
nologies. He noted that basic improvements in the economy must be made so that the
Soviet Union can support "the highest order miUtary technical tasks."
An important aspect of the interrelation between a modernized economy and
the high-technical results for the military appeared in Ogarkov's writings. This aspect
may have given many in the mihtary and their supporters some reasons to seek
Ogarkov's reassignment. As Azrael puts it: "To make matters worse he was also
something of an iconoclast with respect to the Soviet mihtary's long-standing preference
for 'tried and true' \veaponn.^"'^9
Coupled with his firm belief in the scientific-technical revolution in military af-
fairs, this divergence away from the "tried and true" would lead to qualitative changes
in conventional weapons which in turn would effect the rapid obsolescence of many of
the existing weapons systems that many members of the high command continued to
demand in extravagant numbers despite the fact that the resources used to meet their
demands continued to draw heavily on the economy. These demands were also using
resr.urccs which could be put to use exploring and developing high-tech weapons and
futuristic weapons based on new principles. This attitude of Ogarkov's suggests that he
would support cuts in expenditures for the procurement of many costly "oIT-the-shelf
systems. This suggestion is contrar}' to many speculations at the time of his dismissal
to the efTect that the reassignment was related to his vocal demands for increased defense
expenditures. If this contrary opinion is true, it too could have contributed to a move-
ment to "silence" the Marshal.
Even after his reassignment to other duties, Ogarkov continued to express his
opinions about "off-the-shelf procurement practices. In 19S5 he said that a "graphic
manifestation of the law of the negation of the negation" was when new equipment and
'^9 Jeremy R. Azrael, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-86
(Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1987), p. vi.
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weapons "crimp and negate old equipment and weapons generation after generation. "80
He went further in stating that experience showed that the extent of the negation dilTercd
from situation to situation: "In some cases the elimination of that which is obsolete,
out-of-date and retarding further progress is accomplished while retaining some foun-
dations of the existing ones."8i He even sucsested that there were times when
"modifications"—a Soviet technique for modernizing their weapons-no longer gave the
desired result.
In 1986 while Ogarkov himself appeared to remain in silence, others were not.
In The Creative Nature of Soviet Military Science in the Great Patriotic War, Gareyev
echoed the former Chief of the General Staff in reflecting the militar\''s concern that the
Soviet Union is falhng far behind the West in computers and electronics, those things
which are profoundly changing warfare. Gareyev said that he realizes that the Soviet
Union is falling further behind in these areas. "We are opposing enemies considerable
more powerful economically than ever before. "82 This economic threat to the U.S.S.R.
he says is coming from Western electronics technology which is revolutionizing wai 'are.
C. MILITARY REORGANIZATION
During the years of rapid succession of Soviet leaders in the 1980s, some restruc-
turing of military leadership at all levels of the chain of command was expected. What
is striking about the changes which took place in the military is the number of changes
and the background experience of those men assigned to top leadership positions. The
third ingredient necessary for a true revolution in military affairs, that of restructure in
the mihtan.' organization, is present in the case under discussion.
80 Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance.
81 Ibid.
82 M. A. Gareyev, 'The Creative Nature of Soviet Militar\' Science in the Great Patriotic
War," Vovenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, 1985. Translated in Soviet Press, Selected Translations,
Mar-Apr 1986, p. 4.
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The reshufTle of top command personnel in the Soviet Union began in May 1984.
During that month Colonel General S. F. Romanov took over as Senior Soviet repre-
sentative to the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact Forces in East Germany.83
Romanov died on May 22 and in October Colonel General V. K. Meretskov who had
commanded the North Caucasian Military District was identified as his replacement. 84
Meanwhile a promotion had been noted to the ranks of those serving in the Defense
Ministry. Before his election to the Supreme Soviet on March 4, 1984, Marshal K. S.
Moskalenko, who turned 82 on May 11, 1984, had not made a pubhc appearance since
April 1983.85 While he still signed important obituaries and still served as Inspector
General, his position in the lists of such signatures suggested he was no longer a deputy
defense minister.86 Clarification came when then General of the Army V, L. Govorov
(59), who had until then served as commander of the Troops of the Far East, was iden-
tified as a Deputy Minister of Defense in June, and as Inspector General on 1 Septem-
ber.87 Moskalenko retired to the ranks of the Ministry of Defense's General Inspectorate
and died on 17 June.88
The next major "reassignment" was obviously of great political significance. On
September 7, the Soviet press announced that Marshal Ogarkov, who as Chief of the
General Staff had captured world attention by his public defenses of the KAL flight 007
incident and the Soviet's withdrawal from the Geneva arms talks, had been "assianed to
83 David R. Jones, ed., Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual (SAFRA), vol. 9 (Gulf Breeze,





88 Ibid, p. 9.
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other \vork."89 The prevailing speculation in 1984 was that Ogarkov was disgraced and
dismissed for "unparty-like behavior." This behavior, it was speculated, resulted from
his vocal support and demands for increased defense expenditures at a time when eco-
nomic stagnation and malaise was occupying the Party's attention.90
Ogarkov was replaced by his first deputy, Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev.9i The
speculation in 1986 about the new Chief of the General Staff was that as a protege of
former Defense Minister Ustinov and a deputy of Ogarkov, he would lean toward the
policies of Ogarkov more than toward those of Ustinov.92 Supporting this speculation,
Cutshaw cites rumors that Akhromeyev may have been brought into the senior ranks
of Soviet militar\' hierarchy by Ogarkov.93 Cutshaw concludes that "the prognosis for
Akhromeyev having any great impact on the Soviet military is doubtful. "94
During 1987, one major function of the Chief of the General Staff has been to serve
on the Soviet's intermediate nuclear forces (INF) arms control negotiation team.95 In
East European military circles Marshal Akhromeyev is rated as the ablest possible offi-
cer to have succeeded Marshal Ogarkov and is identified as an unconditional supporter
89 For discussions regarding Ogarkov's replacement and speculation as to the reasons, see:
SAFRA, vol. 8 and vol 9; Dale R. Herspring, "The Soviet Military in the Mtermath of the 27th
Party Congress," Orbis, Summer 1986, pp. 297-315; Charles Q. Cutshaw, "Who's in Charge," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1986, pp. 79-83; Brian Crozier, 'The Ogarkov Factor," National
Review, 5 June 1987, p. 22; Mildiail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York,
NY: Summit Books, 1986), pp. 719-720; Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, ed.,
The Soviet Calculus ofNuclear War (Lexington, KY: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), pp. 86-93;
and Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Wasliington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1987), pp. 311-312.
90 SAFRA, vol. 9, p. 10.
91 Herspring, Orbis, p. 299.
92 Ibid, p. 300.
93 Ibid, p. 299.
94 Cutshaw, p. 82.
95 Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Looking at More Accords," New York Times, 3 March 1987; and
Felicity Barringer, "Russian Optimistic on Missile Accord," New York Times, 24 July 1987.
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of the latter's militant doctrine. 96 It appears that he supports Ogarkov's view of ofien-
sive operations using state-of-the-art conventional weapons, and not nuclear weapons,
in decisively deciding a future war.97
Of interest also are the events surrounding the appointment, then forced retirement
of Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov. In December 1984 Minister of Defense Dmitrv^ Ustinov
died. His death, following as it did on Ogarkov's "demotion" seemed at the time to leave
the armed forces in a relatively weak position in Kremlin decision-making circles. This
condition continued throughout the term of Marshal Sokolov and remains today.
Sokolov was clearly a transitional figure, one of the older generation chosen at a
time when the predicted successor, Ogarkov, was in disfavor. Throughout Sokolov's
tenure as Minister of Defense, he remained a candidate (non-voting) member of the
Politburo. He was voted to that status in June 1985, several months after his appoint-
ment as Defense Minister. That he was never appointed to full membership status of
the Politburo of the Central Committee was seen as the Party's way of exerting su-
premacy over the military leadership. The fact that Sokolov was 73 years old at the time
of his appointment also lends credence to the theory that his tenure would not be
marked by a strong influence ovei Soviet defense matters.98
On May 30, 1987 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the
discussion centered around the penetration and violation of Soviet air defenses and
subsequent landing in Red Square of a plane piloted by M. Rust, a citizen of the Federal
Republic of Germany.99 This event served as a useful excuse to initiate more major
changes in the military leadership to bring it more directly under Gorbachev's control.
96 International Defense Review, vol. 20, no. 6/1987, p. 718.
97 Ibid.
98 Cutshaw, p. 81.
99 Krasnaya zvezda, 31 May 1987.
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The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the L'.S.S.R. relieved Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov
"from his duties as U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense in connection with his retirement." i^O
Sokolov was replaced by Army General Dmitri T.Yazov.iOi Several senior officers with
greater political experience were bypassed by Yazov's selection. 102 Yazov is identified
as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee.l03
Figure 3 chronicles the top military leadership changes in the Soviet Union from
1984 to 1987. It is not possible to describe all the changes in the Soviet militar}' caused
by the reassignments at the top and the associated ripple effect of those changes to all
levels of the chain of command. A description of restructuring in the military' organ-
ization is further clouded by the Soviet tendency to vagueness and their propensity not
to pubhsh all changes. Certain generalizations can be made, however, when describing
the most recent resturcturing of the military organization.
The most obvious result of the change is the promotion of a younger generation of
men to the military hierarchy. These men are replacing those with World War II and
immediate post-World War II experience. The generations being replaced were trained
and fought under the doctrine evolved in the Second Revolution. Third Revolution
doctrinal changes require men whose experience is in the theater of operations scale
utilizing conventional and strategic weapons.
The promotion of General Yazov is a prime example of the second element of the
military reorganization. As stated above, Yazov was promoted to the position of
Minister of Defense over several senior officers. A brief chronology of his experience
100 Ibid.
101 For information regarding the special meeting of the Politburo and the declaration of both
the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Soviet Union see: Krasnaya zvezda, 31 May 1987,
p. 1; Soviet Analyst, 3 June 1987, pp. 1-2; and International Defense Re\iew, vol. 20, no. 6/1987,
p. 718.
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Figure 3. Leadership Changes (1984-1987)
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Marshal A. I. Koldunov CO, Air Defense
Gen. I. M. Tretyak Main Inspectorate
1987
Gen. D. T. Yazov Deupty Minister of Defense
for Personnel
Gen. D. T. Yazov Minister of Defense
Marshal A. I. Koldunov CO, Air Defense
(relieved of duty, 1987)
Figure 4. Leadership Changes (Cont'd.)
does identify him as a top contender for advancement. He joined the Soviet army in
1941, graduated from the M. V. Frunze Academy in 1956 and from the U.S.S.R. Armed
Forces General Staff Military Academy in 1967. He is characterized as a "professional
servicing officer."iO^ It is the following experience which marked him for unusual pro-
motion opportunities. Yazov served as First Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern
Military District in the late 1970s, commanded the Central Asian Military District from
1980 to 1984 and returned to the Far Eastern district as commander after that. His im-
portance is seen in his experience with multi-front operation.
The importance of the promotion of men with multi-front operation or theater of
strategic operation experience can be seen being supported by the Party in two specific
occurrences-the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981 and the Twenty-seventh Party
Congress in 1986. In 1981 General Govorov was elected a Central Committee member
on the grounds of the post he filled. This post was one restored in November
104 Soviet Analyst, 3 June 1987, p. 1.
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1980--commander in chief of Far Eastern Forces. 105 This restoration was seen as a
forerunner of the next important occurrence.
In 1986 at the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, the inclusion of the three
commanders in chief of the forces in the Western, Southwestern and Southern strategic
military system in the composition of military representatives on the Central Committee
and the Central Auditing Commission was seen an an important event. 106 The outcome
of these moves is that ail theater of strategic military actions (TVD) commanders are
now full Central Committee members, "a clear sign that they have been granted a greater
role in Soviet militar\' planning. "107 Indeed these changes-the promotions and the cre-
ation of the new posts-serve as indicators of the doctrinal change.
A third trait is hishUghted bv the absence of vocal and vieorous doctrinal dis-
cussions. An examination of current Soviet publications reveals a dearth of mihtary
policy proclamations and an almost non-recognition of the mihtary by the party leader-
ship. This factor can be seen as an attempt by the party to draw western attention away
from Soviet military matters. This measure can also been seen as a tactic similar to the
large Soviet force reductions in the past and an invoking of the cliche, "out of sight, out
of mind."
105 Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 27 March 1986, p. 3.
106 Ibid.
107 Herspring, Orbis, p. 303.
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IV. EXAMINATION OF THE FACTOR OF ECONOMIC REFORM
The comparison of the suspected current dialectical evolution has thus far concen-
trated on the military aspects: the perceived threat from advancing Western technology,
faltering Soviet mihtan/' technology, changes in military doctrine and the ensuing reor-
ganization of militar\^ leadership. The next step is to examine subsequent economic re-
forms and proposed peace initiatives linked to this military stimulus. The next feature
of the process is currently expressed in the economic reform policies of M. Gorbachev,
but did not start with him. They started with the years of succession in the early 19SOs
which followed the doctrinal changes of the 1970s.
A. THE YEARS OF PARTY SUCCESSION
In order to understand the economic reforms of Gorbachev, certain factors of his
inheritance must be examined. When Mikhail S. Gorbachev ascended to the position
of General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985, he inherited many things from
Brezhnev, Andropov and Chcrnenko.it)8
Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982 and was succeeded by Yuri Andropov.
Andropov, who was 68 at that time, was elected as General Secretary of the CPSU on
12 November.109 Andropov was reported to be ill at the time of his appointment, dis-
appeared from public view in September 1983 and died in February 1984.110 With the
108 For discussions on Gorbachev's inlieritance see: Hans-Joachin Veen, ed., From Brezhnev
to Gorbachev (New \'ork, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1984); Robert F. Byrnes, ed., After Brezhnev:
Sources of Soviet Conduct in the J9S0s (Bloomington, IN; Indiana University Press, 1983);
Jonathan Steele, S(7\-iet Power (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983); The Soviet Union.
19S4iS5, Events, Problems, Perspectives, edited by the Federal Institute for East European and
International Studies (Boulder. CO: Westview Press. 1986); Dusko Doder. Shadows and Whipsers
(New York, NY: Random House, 1986); and Mikiiail Heller ;ind x-^Vleksandr M. Nekricii, Utopia
in Power (New York, NY: Summit Books, 1986), chps. 11 and 12.
109 Heller and Nekrich, pp. 724-728.
no Ibid.
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election of Konstanin Chernenko as General Secretan- on Februar>- 13, replacing the
gap left by Andropov, the old guard appeared to be exerting one last attempt to control
the Party.HI At the time of his election, however, Chernenko was 73 and fated to a reign
similar to Andropov's. On March 10, 1985 Konstanin Chernenko died.H2
Chernenko is considered to have been basically a caretaker during his brief tenure;
Andropov is credited to have made a lasting impact on the future of the Soviet Union.
One of the most important legacies resulted in the selection of the next General Secre-
tary. On March 11, 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary' of the
CPSU Central Committee.lB
B. THE ANDROPOV LEGACY
xMikhail S. Gorbachev is considered a protege of Yuri Andropov and is reported to
have had power even before his ascension to the pinnacle of Soviet leadership. It was
clear that during Andropov's time in power that Gorbachev was being groomed for
succession.H4 Medvedev states: "It was well known in the Soviet Union and abroad
that Gorbachev had been second in command in the Soviet leadership since Andropov's
death."n5 The two men had shared the same ideas for a number of years about the ur-
gent need for modernization. Speculation exists about meetings between Andropov and
the then regional party chief, Gorbachev, during Andropov's visits to the spas for
treatment in Gorbachev's reG:ion.li6
111 Doder, pp. 18-19.
112 HeUer and Nekrich, pp. 724-728.
113 Ibid., p. 756.
114 Zhores A. Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986),
pp. 6-7; and Christian Schmidt-IIauer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power (Topsfield, MA: Salem
House Publishers, 1986), pp. 16, 63-65.
115 Medvedev, p. 6-7.
116 Sclimidt-Hauer, p. 64.
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Two additional events suggest that Gorbachev benefitted from a powerful patron.
His rise through party positions more rapidly than anyone since Stalin's death is one
factor. A second indication of high party support is that when Gorbachev was assigned
as the Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, he had never managed the Central
Committee Department for Agriculture, an occurrence which went against normal party
procedures.! 17
Gorbachev inherited more than just Andropov's tutelage, however. He inherited the
legacy of an economy and a country with much wrong with it.
C. THE ECONOMIC INHERITANCE
At the end of the Brezhnev era, the Soviet economy was in a crisis. No less au-
thority than Pravda summed up the "negative phenomena" that were producing the
devastating effects of "violations of labor discipline, embezzlement and bribe taking,
profiteering and sponging, drunkenness and hooliganism, displays of private-property
and money grubbing psychology, toadyism and servility."! 18
The predictions for the future of the Soviet Union in the 1980s are many. 119 The
consensus is that the Soviet leaders faced unprecedented conditions of resource limita-
tions in the 1980s as the grovnh of the economy slackened and as resource expectations
and demands of the various claimants on the nation's output expanded. The predictions
of such authors as Hoskins, Bvrnes, Heller and Nekrich have been borne true bv statis-
tics. The gross national product (GNP) has grown on the average of abut 2.2 percent
annually since the middle 1970s, only half the rate for the previous decade. These sta-
in Ibid.
118 Quoted in Timothy J. Colton. The Dilemma of Reforms in the Soviet Union (New York,
NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986, rev. ed.), p. 33.
119 See: After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the JOSOs, chp. 2 and 8; T/ie Soviet
Union, J9S4:85; Heller and Nekrich, chp. 11, 12, and 13; From Brezhnev to Gorbachev; and GeoiTrey
Hosking, The First Socialist Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), chp. 15.
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tistics confirm that the grave problems inherited by Gorbachev are on even a larger
scale. 120
Another sign of trouble is the virtual halt to improvement in consumer standards.
Between 1956 and 1965, there was an average 3 percent increase per year. After the next
decade saw an annual growth of per capita consumption of closer to 4 percent, the an-
nual grovnh of per capita consumption has fallen to less than 1.5 percent since 1976.
In 1985, it was about one-half of 1 percent.
Yuri Andropov is credited as being aware of the systemic crisis which was gripping
the Soviet Union. His experience as head of the KGB was instru.n.ivi..tal in his enlight-
enment. During his tenure as KGB chief, that organization and consequently Andropov
himself had increased, in-depth contact with the Western world. Andropov eventually
had a greater working knowledge of the enemies of sociahsm than most party leaders
during the same time and since then. What he learned, he brought with him when he
became General Secretary.
To fill in the gaps in Soviet industrial-military technology, Andropov's organization
increasingly emphasized the under-the-table acquisition of scientific texts, plans for new
equipment, and actual samples of high-technology items. The future leader of the Soviet
Union was made very aware of the strides of Western technology and the great inability
of the Soviets to attain comparable technology. The development of personnel under
Andropov reflected the impact of this knowledge. "These bright executive-type KGB
people are speciaHsts in a variety of scientific-industrial fields. They are socially adapt-
able and well equipped to talk shop with scientists at conventions, in social settings or
120 U.S., Congress. Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security
Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and
China-/985, 99th Cons., 2d sess., 19 March 1986 (Wasliington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1986).
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in other relaxed environments that encourage ail-too-free conversations. "121 These ac-
tivities reflected the changing KGB target areas abroad toward technology.
Before becoming General Secretarv^ Andropov set priorities at supportmg the
changing military doctrine using the resources at his command. When he became Gen-
eral Secretary in 1982, he knew of the inadequacies of the Soviet system to compete with,
much less destroy, the forces of capitalism. Andropov was the first Soviet leader to in-
herit a superpower whose military strength equalled that of its rival. He was also better
informed than anyone else how the many and varied ills of the Soviet economy under-
mined their military strength. The reforms he introduced were aimed at correcting what
he saw as the main cause of the disease and its related symptoms. His reforms were
based on his experiences as KGB chairman which were successful for him then-
discipline, anti-corruption campaigns and purges.
In his campaign to strengthen the Soviet Union, Andropov failed to take into ac-
count two very pressing factors-his age and his health. Seventeen months after as-
cending to the position of General Secretar\', Andropov passed on the reigns of control.
D. THE DEFENSE INHERITANCE
Abraham S. Becker discusses the other burden which Gorbachev inherited from his
three predecessors, that of Soviet defense expenditures. 122 While there is still a debate
concerning the quantity of the Soviet defense expenditures and their growth during the
Brezhnev era, the fact remains that the Soviets did expend great amounts of resources
to build up their military' during that period. The prime goals of the economic system
implanted on the U.S.S.R. by Stalin were the growth of Soviet military power along with
121 Martin Ehon, The Andropov File (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Compaiiv, 1983),
p. 81.
122 Abraham S. Becker,Sitting on Bayonets: The Soviet Defense Burden and (he Slowdown
of Soviet Defense Spending (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1986).
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the growth of the economic foundations on which it rested. 123 The Soviet leadership has
long been anxious to create a strong miUtary base to offset its economic weakness. "This
weakness induces the Soviet leadership to expend ever increasing amounts of the coun-
tr\''s resources required to fulfill plans for armaments and the armed forces. "124
It is evident, however, that only a major commitment of resources between 1961 and
1981 has enabled the Soviet Union to attain strategic parity with the United States,
maintain large well-equipped forces in Europe and along the frontier with China, extend
the deployment of the Soviet Navy throughout the world, and engage in continuous
modernization of arms and equipment.l25 A military elTort of this scale necessarily has
far-reaching impact on the Soviet economy. 1 26
Western estimates indicate a decrease of the Soviet GNP from 6 or 7 percent a year
in the 1950s to 5 percent in the 1960s and to under 4 percent in the 1970s. 127 The GNP
of the United States grew at a rate of 4 percent annually in the 1960s and 2.9 percent in
the 1970S.128
While experiencing a decline in their GNP, over the same time frame, the Soviets
engaged in building up their military forces. "At the conservative estimate of 4 to 5
percent grovnh per year, total Soviet miUtary expenditures must have increased between
2.2 and 2.7 times over the 20 vears."i29
123 Ibid., p. 37.
124 Heller and Nekrich, p. 643.
125 David Holloway, War, Militarism and the Soviet State, working paper no. 17 (New York:
Institute for World Order, Incorporated, 1981), p. 2.
126 Ibid.
127 Becker, p. 1.
128 United States, President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, Panel on
the .American Economy: Employment, Productivity and Inllation, The America?} Economy: Em-
plovment, Productivity and Inflation in the Eighties (Washinszton, DC: Government Printing Office,
1980), pp. 3-4.
129 Becker, p. 1.
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Thus the Soviet Union has amassed military power roughly comparable to that of
the United States, even through its Gross National Product was only about half as large
during the corresponding time. It is these expenditures which in turn continue to
weaken the Soviet economy. The sluggish economic growth of the Soviet Union imperils
future militaiy power by slowing the development of its economic underpinnings.
E. THE OGARKOV FACTOR
The last aspect of Gorbachev's inheritance is not as obvious as the others were. It
is quite apparent that Gorbachev succeeded to the position of leadership of a country
that was in the grip of systemic economic and psychological crisis caused by the char-
acteristics of that system itself. That there had been a spectacular growth of Soviet
military power and that this power is an imperative for the Soviet Union is also obvious.
The discussion of the choice of "guns or butter" has been of importance for the Soviet
leadership since the last years of Brezhnev. The last aspect of the inheritance can be
found in this discussion.
As has been stated, Ogarkov's dismissal as Chief of the General Staff in 1984 was
thought in the West at the time to have been the result of his outspoken demands for
increased defense expenditures at a time of economic restraints, consumer unrest, and
reduced resources. Where Ogarkov was assigned indicates a different interpretation.
In the weeks following his dismissal, Marshal Ogarkov made several appearances
that left little doubt that his destination was not to be that of those who had been dis-
missed in the past or would be in the future. It was clear that he was not to become a
"non-person". 130 Discussion goes on as to exactly what position Ogarkov was assigned
to and what his duties are. Whether he was assigned to the position of Commander-in-
130 On October 12, 1984, Ogarkov appeared in East Berlin and met with Erich Ilonecker. the
East German leader. .Although not reported in the Soviet press, this meeting was prominently re-
ported on East German television and in Neues Deutschland (see New York Times, 14 October
1984, p. A 17).
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Chief of the Western TVD (Europe) or to a forward deployed headquarters of the su-
preme high command itself or to the position of deputy minister of defense (top miUtary
advisor to Gorbachev), the consensus is that rather than actual punishment, the reas-
signment reflects more a recognition of his views of a future war and advancement of
resource allocation decisions which must meet the rapidly changing high technology re-
quirements of that future war.l3l
Azrael sees Ogarkov's reassignment as an opportunity for the Marshal to preside
over the activation of one of the most important of the multi-front headquarters that
had been recently estabhshed at his own instigation ^?'' In Always Ready to Defend the
Fatherland, published in 1982, Ogarkov lists "the compUcation of the process of com-
mand and control (upravleniya) of troops and forces which demands a principally new
approach to the organizational structure of specific systems of command and control
and of obtaining from them the necessary contemporary technological means of man-
agement. "133
'o^
F. GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC REFORMS
Mikhail Gorbachev inherited a souring economy, featuring slow growth rates, tech-
nological backwardness and an unmanageable crisis in agriculture, which contributed to
a general social malaise, evidenced by rampant alcoholism and corruption, low birth
rates, and a decline in morale. What he brought to the position was a whole new agenda
for reform within the Soviet Union.
131 John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, "Changing the Soviet System of Control," Inter-
nationa/Defense Review, vol. 19, no. 3/1986, p. 282; Jeremy R. i-\zrael,77ie Soviet Civilian Leader-
ship and the Military High Command, 1976-86 (Santa Monica, CA; The Rand Corporation, 1987),
and Crozier, p. 22.
132.^rael, p. 36.
133 Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva (Always Ready to Defend the
Fatherland).
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Gorbachev's program lor reform has its own language. The terms glasnost
(openness), perestroika (restructuring) and uskorenie (acceleration) have become the
watch words for the Soviet press and leadership and for the Western world in general.
Glasnost has received the greatest attention both in the West and in the Soviet Union
mainly because of its implications for a closed society. The concept of "acceleration",
carries even greater implications for the West because it acknowledges the increasing gap
in many important areas between the L'.S.S.R. and the West, It calls for a reversal of
existing trends by "restructuring" the economy, intensive (rather than extensive) devel-
opment, technological retooling, and massive change in popular attitudes.
What Gorbachev has actually been calling for in the past two years is formulated
on the "concept of accelerating the country's social and economic development on the
basis of scientific and technological progress."! 34 Many experts have likened
Gorbachev's economic reforms to those of Andropov. Andropov only had time to in-
stitute the discipline, anti-drunkenness portion of his economic reform campaign which
proved to be ultimately less wide-ranging, goal-, resource-, and productivity-oriented
than Gorbachev's. 135 While Gorbachev's policies are clearly reminiscent of Andropov's,
they go beyond them.
More important than examining the individual measures, however, is the examina-
tion of the expected accumulated outcome of these reforms. The ultimate goal of these
reforms is to change the shape of the technological future of the world.
Looking to the future he (Gorbachev) seems to dread the specter of technological
backwardness-not only, or even primarily because of what it could imply for the
East-West mihtary balance but because of what k would imply for the Soviet Un-
ion's broader claim to superpower status and hence for the legitimacy of the Soviet
system. 136
U^ Pra^-da, 12 June 1985.
135 The Soviet Union, 19S4iS5, pp. 134-137.
136 /\zrael, p. 41.
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The ase-old threat from advancing Western teclinolosv is once asain acknowledeed.'»
Equally problematic, from the viewpoint o[ the Soviet leadership, is the challenge
posed m the high-technology area of robotics, supercomputers, lasers, optics, tele-
communications, and so on, where the U.S.S.R. is in danger of falling increasing
behind the West. In the narrower, strictly militar>' sense, there is the threat that
'smart' battlefield weapons and advanced detection systems could neutralize the
U.S.S.R.'s quantitative advantages in miUtar\' hardware. 137
Gorbachev, himself, has seen the importance of technology in the Soviet future. He has
admitted that the most alarming prospect for the Soviets is that they have begun to lag
behind in scientific and technical development. In 1 985, he said, "Microelectronics,
computer technology, instrument making and the entire information-science industry are
the catalyst of progress. They require accelerated development. "138
In his political report at the beginning of the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev set
the tone, theme and course for the Congress. "The 27th CPSU Congress has convened
at a major turning point in the life of the country and of today's world as a whole. "139
The strategy of the turning point is "accelerating the country's social and economic de-
velopment . . .."140 The essence of acceleration "is a new quality of growth: the all-round
intensification of production on the basis of scientific and technical process, the re-
structuring of the economy, and the effective forms of management, of organizing labor
and of providing incentives. "i^l The reforms of Gorbachev do indeed seem to be linked
to an awareness of a loss of important ground for the Soviets in the area of high tech-
nology.
137 Paul Keimedy, "What Gorbachev is Up Against," The At/antic Monthly, June 1987, p. 33.
138 M. S. Gorbachev, report to CPSU Central Committee on 11 June 1985, published in
Pravda, 12 June 1985. Translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVII, no. 23,
3 July 1985, p. 4.
139 M. S. Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 25 February 1 986, Pravda, 26 February 1986.
Translated in T/ie Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVIII, no. 8, 26 March 1986, p. 4.
140 Ibid, p. 11.
141 Ibid.
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The reforms are also linked to the fact that what worked in the past will not work
in the future. For example, in a Gorbachev speech to the party leadership in
Khabarovsk, he said:
The current restructuring embraces not only the economy but all other facets of
public life: social relations, the poUtical system, the spiritual and ideological sphere,
and the style and methods of the work of the party and all our cadres. "Restruc-
turing" is a capacious word. I would equate the word "restructuring" with the word
"revolution" . . ..
There will be no move forward if we seek the answers to new questions in the
economy and in technology by looking to the experience of the thirties, forties, fifties
or even sixties and seventies. This is a different time, with different demands and
different requirements. 1-^2
At a June 1986 meeting of the Central Committee, Gorbachev continued to advance
the idea that the Soviets could no longer rely on past technologies: "We cannot allow
billions to be invested in obsolete projects that are based on technically unfit
solution. "l'*3 Gorbachev has become aware of the fact that while the countries in the
West were reorganizing their economies to save resources and make full use of the latest
technological achievements, the U.S.S.R squandered its rich natural resources in waste-
ful, outmoded production processes or in exporting them to earn hard currency, not to
modernize industry, but merely to cope with current demands.
The time frame for the economic reforms is also of interest. Gorbachev's major
changes would not be made until the late 1990s or early 2000s. l*^** The results of the
modernization on the Soviet economy as a whole is not expected to be fully in effect
until the end of the new fifteen-year plan. There appears to be coincidence in the time
frames stated by Western technological experts and the high Soviet leadership.
142 Speech to the Khabarovsk party actifon 31 July 1986, Pravda, 2 August 1986. Translated
in The Cutrent Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVIII, no. 31, 3 September 1986, pp. 1-3.
143 Pravda, 17 June 1986.
144 Quoted in Soviet Analyst, vol. 16, no. 5, 11 .March 1987, p. 7.
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G. THE PEACE INITIATIVE VARIABLE
The final component identified in tlie historical perspective was peace initiatives.
The underlying reasons for those peace moves had always been the same:
1. a reduction of world tensions which allowed the Soviets to redirect resource
allocations-typically away from debihtating mihtary expenditures toward achieving
necessary economic advances;
2. an increased interaction with more advanced countries resulting from the lessened
tensions—the ultimate goal of which is the exchange and acquisition of ultramodern
technology, scientific and educational exchanges, and joint adventures whose ben-
efits, though touted as "mutual" are mostly gained by the Soviets;
3. a diversion of attentiion away from the real benefactor of Soviet economic
reform-- the militar}';
4. the achievement of a degree of success of economic reforms;
5. a qualitative advance in areas of military high technology which was originally
identified as antiquated or non-existent.
Similar peace offers and campaigns exist in relation to the Third Revolution. These
factors were not apparent at the onset. The early years of the evolutionary process was
characterized by the uncertainity and ills of the time. Detente was collapsing, Brezhnev
was ill and just hanging on. The rapid succession of the subsequent leaders did not allow
for major policy proclamations of any sort. Ultimately the reaction to the fear that the
United States was once again outstripping the U.S.S.R. not only in current mihtary ca-
pabihties but also in new technologies with significant future military potential was
spurred by the massive American military buildup of President Reagan.
The tenor of Gorbachev's peace moves showed up almost immediately after his
succession. In a speech to the CPSU Central Committee on 1 1 March 1985, Gorbachev
said, "In the field of foreign policy our course is clear and consistent. It is the course
of peace and progress, "l-^S In the interview which the new General Secretary granted to
Time in September 1985, this theme was repeated. He indicated that his reason for
granting the interview is that he wanted the opportunity to communicate to the West
145 Pravda, 12 March 1985.
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his major theme: his deep concern--and his hopes—for future U.S., Soviet relations. He
impUed that his stress on revitahzing the economy of the Soviet Union would require a
relative peaceful, stable relationship with the rival superpower. He asked, "What are the
external conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domestic plans? I leave the
answer with you."i-^6 Gorbachev's peace drives have continued in this vein throughout
his two and a half years in office.
As a result of his pohcies, the world has witnessed a calliope of Soviet peace initi-
atives and grand examples of their "peace loving ways." Gorbachev and various Soviet
leaders have held summits in a variety of locations with many different U.S. represen-
tatives including the President. The acclaimed goal is a more peaceful world through
arms control. Two years of negotiations appear to be resulting in an "historic" arms
control treaty.
A great many distinctive peace groups, in particular those from the United States,
have been invited to and hosted by the Soviet Union. To further advance the notion
that things have really changed in that country, dissidents have been released from
internal exile. Unprecedented acts, such as Gorbachev placing a telephone call to Andrei
Sakharov announcing his release, have been pubUcized. The words glasnost, perestroika
and uskorenie have become terms of peaceful incantation.
In an attempt to convince the world of the sincerity of the Soviet's "peaceful" in-
tentions, rumors of the subordination of the military have been allowed to escape to an
expectant world. Much speculation has resulted over the supposed cuts to the military
budget and the militar\''s reaction, to both the cuts and to Gorbachev's drive for the
INF treaty. Review of the lack of the assignment of military representation to top party
posts, especially to the PoUtburo, has led to suspicions of a rift between Gorbachev with
his new technocrats and the miUtary leadership.
146 George J. Church, "Moscow's Vigorous Leader," Time, 9 September, 1985. p. 17.
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Conjecture of the suppression of military influence arose in the wake of Twenty-
seventh Party Congress statements. "A clause in the Draft Program has not served the
military interest. It breaks ground for reserving for party leaders the right to formulate
Soviet military' doctrine, which included forecasting the probability of war."l47
None of these rumors have received substantiation by hard actions. Questions are
raised on the basis of these conjectures. Why the staged performances of the benevolent
country? Why these drives at peace initiatives? Why the rumored reduction of the im-
portance of the mihtary in a country which has given the miUtar\' top priority for the
past 70 years? Why the attempt to project the image of a peace loving country whose
only concern is the betterment of the life of its citizens?
While there may be some degree of substance to truth of these speculations, it could
also be that these measures fulfill the requirement for the last piece of the doctrinal
puzzle. It is apparent that Gorbachev needs a lowering of world tensions to achieve his
domestic goals. Such a stabilization of international relations will ultimately result in
the reallocation of greatly needed yet currently scarce resources from the ever demanding
militar>' to economic modernization. A relaxed world environment will also allow the
Soviets to tak; legal advantage of the technological advanced countries, some of whom
have been in opposition to the Soviets in the past. Example countries are Japan, West
Germany and the United States. The final variable required for Soviet mihtary doctrinal
revolution is occurring.
H. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR
The Soviet concept of war is unique and is an important controlling factor in the
revolution of mihtary affairs. War for the Soviets encompasses more than armed com-
bat. The mihtary is in charge of the elements of armed struggle-mihtary strategy and
147 Sidney I. Floss, "A New Soviet Era?" Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, pp. 55-56.
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military science. The Soviets, however, are guided by Clausewitz's formula that war is
a cominuation of politics. "We know that a war is not limited to armed struggle. It also
involves other forms of struggle-economic, political and ideological—employed in the
conduct of war."H8
Soviet military decisionmaking is dominated by the Party and ultimately by the
Politburo. The Defense Council oversees the preparation of the country, economy and
people for war.l49 it is the highest decisionmaking body for all aspects of national se-
curity policy. 150 The council conveys the Party's wishes on all defense, budgetary, or-
ganizational and senior personnel matters. The current membership of the Defense
Council appears to be composed of a majority of Politburo members without mihtary
representation. M. Gorbachev is the chairman.
The Pohtburo is also in charge of the other areas of war-economics, politics, ideol-
ogy, science and technology. The struggle for economic reform and advancement in
science and technology, therefore, should be considered important in their own right.
The moves at economic, science and technical reform carry even greater implications
when considering the "correlation of forces".
The "correlation of forces" is a calculation of many factors used as a mode of anal-
ysis for Soviet leaders in assessing and building the strength of their country. 151 Many
components are utilized in calculating the "correlations of forces". The economic and
military potentials of different states and their associations constitute important ele-
148 S. A. Bartenev, Economic Conjlict in Warfare (Moscow: Militar\' Publishins House,
1986).
149 Scott, p. 107.
150 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1987, 6th ed. (Wasliington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1987), p. 1.
151 For discussions on correlation of forces, see: Vemon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global
Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of Communism, May-June 1980, pp. 1-18; and V.
Zagladin, "World Balance of Forces and the Development of International Relations," International
Affairs (Moscow), March 1985, pp. 65-79.
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ments. Other factors include "the existence of rehable socio-poUtical aUies among other
states, national contingents of congenial classes, mass international movements and
other political forces active in the world scene" 152 and intrinsic social factors and the
direction of their movements—for or against the status quo.
The possibihty exists that a calculation of the international "correlation of forces"
showed the current Soviet leadership the necessity for both economic and technical re-
form not only to maintain a military equality with the United States but also to sustain
general state power. Historically the Soviet Union survived and developed its capabili-
ties for decades when it was mihtarily weak. The leadership had to rely upon other than
conventional elements of national power to make up for its military deficiencies. 153 ". .
. the Soviet leadership is experienced and well versed in the manipulation and
mobilization of various 'exotic' nonmilitary elements that can be factored into the 'cor-
relation of forces. '"154
At this time, the Soviets are not in a weakened military position; they have achieved
parity with the United States. It is the advancement of U.S. technology in areas of new
physical concepts which threatens the current favorable "correlation of forces". The
present status quo in the military balance will free the Soviets to mobilize non-military
elements to develop and advance such technologies as microcircuitrv', electronics and
"new physical concepts" in the calculation of the "correlation of forces".
I. THE OBSCURE LIiNK
The most difficult linkage to examine in this discussion is the connection between
the present General Secretary and the former Chief of the General StafT. An in-depth
152 A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of International Re-
lations," Iniernaiional Affairs (Moscow), May 1975, p. 103.
153 Aspaturian, p. 9.
154 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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examination of any subject involving the Soviet Union is made all the more diiricult by
the nature of the society itself. The Soviet Union is a closed society with a propensity
to deception and secrecy. The cultural background of the Russian society which cloaks
it leaders in a shroud of silence compounds the diiTiculdes of estabhshing a relationship
between the two men. Yet many experts have sought to do just that. 155
Keeping in mind these constraints, a pattern of relationship has emerged through
the research connected with this discussion. The connection between these two men
became evident in 1983. Yuri Andropov was General Secretary. Gorbachev-being
groomed for the top Soviet leadership-served as Andropov's second in command.
When Andropov disappeared from public view in September 1983, reportedly from ill-
ness, it was Gorbachev who assumed the reigns of power. It was this same man who
chaired the crisis management group to handle the downing of the Korean Airline Flight
007 in September 1983 and who appointed Marshal Ogarkov to explain the incident to
the press. 156 Ogarkov was assigned to talk with the press after the Soviets walked out
of the INF negotiations in Geneva in 1983.157 Though the short tenure of Chernenko
revealed no stellar appearances by Ogarkov, that Ogarkov as the Chief of the General
Staff and Gorbachev, again as second in command to an ailing Chernenko had dcahngs
is highly likely.
Ogarkov's reassignment in September 1984 could have indeed been solely a discipli-
nary measure but it could have equally been for a combination of reasons. The pro-
spective General Secretan.', Gorbachev, did not yet wield the same power under
Chernenko as he did under his mentor, Andropov. Me thus would have been unable to
stymie any action against Ogarkov. Yet as the "crown prince" Gorbachev could have
155 For a discussion oflinlcs between Ogarkov and Gorbachev, see: Crozier, "The Ogarkov
Factor"; Medvedev, Gorbachev, pp. 130 and 231-234; and Greeuwald, p. 131.
156 Medvedev, p. 130.
157 Doder, p. 202.
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used influence to extend some protection to Ogarkov. That Ogarkov was not disgraced
or retired or both lends credence to tliis. A contribution to Ogarkov's favorable "reas-
signment" is easily that the mihtary doctrinal revolution espoused by him was the pre-
cursor to the economic reforms of Gorbachev. Their goals are the same. A good tactic
would be to remove Ogarkov from the poHtical arena where he was an irritant to the
"Old Guard" and to put him in a position which would allow him to concentrate on
honing the militar^'-operational portion of his revolution, especially if there were now a
proponent of that revolution in the political arena at the highest levels of leadership.
The link between the two men would appear even stronger today. As shown, dis-
cussions based on the theories of Ogarkov goes on today in the Soviet Union. The
Marshal himself is not altogether quiet. In October 1986, a short article by Ogarkov
appeared in the October issue of the "Mihtar>' Bulletin" which is published by the Soviet
press agency, Novosti. In the article Ogarkov repeated his call for modern equipment
and increased firepower for the Soviet arm.ed forces. 1^8 "He stressed that Soviet military
doctrine required an industry capable of solving even the most difficult defense-
equipment problems and capable of producing the sophisticated equipment
necessary."l59 At a time when Gorbacliev continued his shake-up of the top militaiy
leadership, it is doubtful he would allow the publication of an article by a mihtar}' leader
such as Ogarkov if it did not lefleci the General Secretar\''s thinking.
The joining offerees of these two men portends an important implication. The first,
Ogarkov, supports evolutionan-' technology for the security of the Soviet Union. He has
stressed avenues available to the Soviets which when used could give them the military
technological advantage. He is a technocrat but not a politician; and, he can be called
a fore-sighted, professional military oflicer.
158 International Defense Review, vol. 20, no. 1/1987, p. 14.
159 Ibid.
58
Gorbachev's education and experiences, on the other hand, are quite lacking in
militar}' expertise. He does, however, know economics and appears to know iiis enemies.
He can be credited with being a master of pubUc relations. He has successfully built a
world image of peace-maker, mediator and diplomatic expert.
If these tw^o men are united in a doctrinal revolution, their combined efforts toward
the single goal of socialism over capitalism bodes nothing but ill for the West.
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V, CONCLUSION
Predicting a countr>''s future courses of action based on any study is not possible.
What can be achieved is the identification of a nation's liistoric patterns of behavior.
Examination of these traditional patterns then leads to the enumeration of common
variables. These repetitive factors can then be used as discriminators against current
events in the country' under study. This practice ultimately can be used elTectively by
another country in determining policies.
The comparison of traditional patterns of behavior against current events in the
Soviet Union can also result in misconstrued information. While this possibihty exists,
in many cases, the comparison serves to clarify and focus issues. When considering the
ultimate benefactor of Russian and Soviet economic reform—the military-the latter
strikes true.
Soviet economic reform proposed to benefit the average citizen does appear to have
an underlying purpose. Economic reform seems to be necessary for advances in
indigenous technology.
In the 1990s, a successful economic revitalization program could have a significant
eflect on the military. If the Soviets achieve at least partial success in industrial
modernization and can sustain accelerated growth, the economic base for military
modernization-most importantly in sophisticated, high technology systems-will be
strengthened substantially. 160
The motivating fiictor for the quest of competitive technology has actually been a factor
within another. Changing military doctrine has historically preceded both economic re-
form and the resulting advancement of Soviet miUtary technology needed to support
doctrinal change. The stimulus of military doctrine is created by the leadership. In
160 Soviet Military Power, 19S7, p. 15.
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continual comparison with the rival superpower, Soviet leaders find their country sadly
lacking. This preceived lag is the ultimate threat to the Soviets. Capitalism should not
be overtaking sociahsm. This process should be reversed.
An examination of current events in the Soviet Union utilizing these variables as
comparative factors has impact for the United States. If the present events are indica-
tors that the Third Revolution in military affairs is in progress, its conclusion will have
as much effect on the United States as the first two did. The ultimate goal of the Soviets
is the demise of capitalism--with the United States as proxy. The policy considerations
in general are elementary. Does the United States help or hinder the Soviet Union in its
new quest? What end result is desired? In reaching decisions, U.S. policymakers must
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